In their seminal work, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that in competitive insurance markets, under asymmetric information, pooling contracts cannot exist in equilibrium, firms make zero profit, and, under some circumstances, equilibrium does not exist. In the present work, the model is extended by introducing unobservable wealth in addition to the differing risks.
INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , it has become clear that competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information display features not known from the conventional competitive analysis. Contracts specify both quantity and price, and it may happen that equilibrium does not exist.
The nonexistence problem has led to a lengthy debate in the literature. Solutions proposed are other equilibrium concepts (Wilson, 1977; Miyazaki, 1977; Spence, 1978) , extensions to multi-stage games (Grossman, 1979; Hellwig, 1987; Asheim and Nilssen, As was already argued by Spence (1978, p. 427) , "not only may individuals differ in the expected cost they impose upon the insurer, they may also differ in their preferences with respect to insurance coverage." Following up on this remark, the author considers individuals who differ in risk aversion in addition to their risks. There are two dimensions of asymmetric information-the insurer observes neither the risk nor the degree of risk aversion of the individual. The author models the different degrees of risk aversion by assuming that individuals have decreasing absolute risk aversion and different wealth levels.
Other studies on multidimensional adverse selection problems in the context of insurance markets include the ones by Fluet and Pannequin (1997) and Landsberger and Meilijson (1996) . The first authors model two types of individuals with multiple risks. Their main result is that bundling insurance contracts can be efficiency enhancing. Landsberger and Meilijson analyze the case in which two types of individuals differ with respect to their distribution of losses. However, they are mainly concerned with the derivation of assumptions under which a first-best result can be achieved or approximated.
In contrast to these studies, this article assumes that there are four different types of individuals: those with high or low risks with either high or low wealth. To the author's knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes the insurance market with four unobservable types. It derives the following new results. First, in the standard case, where the single crossing property holds in the relevant region of the contract space, different wealth types are pooled, while different risk types are separated. This pooling is the same as in the first-best situation, in which different risks obtain full insurance at their fair premium, which is independent of the wealth. Second, the effect of the additional dimension on the equilibrium nonexistence problem is ambiguous: It may happen that if wealth is observable, no equilibrium would exist, but it does exist for unobservable wealth, and vice versa. Third, if the single crossing property does not hold, then even under perfect competition with free entry an equilibrium may exist in which firms make positive profits.
1 Fourth, if the single crossing property does not hold, partial risk pooling, where one type mixes between two contracts and another risk type chooses one of the two contracts, can exist in equilibrium. Fifth, complete risk pooling, where different risk types choose the same contract with a probability of one, exists only under very restrictive assumptions.
Generalizing from the results, the author is led to conclude that an equilibrium in a competitive insurance market under multidimensional adverse selection is either with a pooling of types that are also pooled in the first best and at the same time with complete separation of risks, or with a partial risk pooling, where some types with the same risk are separated.
The study is structured as follows. The author first presents the model and discusses the slope of the indifference curves as a function of risk and wealth. The study then deals with the standard case, where the single crossing property holds in the relevant region of the contract space, before the violation of the single crossing property is considered. Finally, the results are summarized.
THE MODEL
Consider an individual who has the probability Q of losing L. Her initial wealth is X , and her utility function displays decreasing absolute risk aversion. The insurer offers a contract that specifies a premium P and an indemnity I that will be paid if a loss occurs. Thus the expected utility of the individual is:
where U is a concave increasing function that satisfies decreasing absolute risk aversion, i.e.,
The literature so far has been concerned with an adverse selection problem on the probability of losses É Q . In this study, the discussion will be extended for unobserv-
The slope of the indifference curve in (I, P) space is given by:
where 1 P X X and 2
. It is easy to show that the second derivative is negative; thus the indifference curves are increasing and concave.
If the loss probability increases, the term É 1 / Q Q decreases, and with that the slope of the indifference curve increases. Thus at every point in an (I, P) diagram, high-risk individuals have a steeper indifference curve, given that the wealth and the loss are the same. With a similar argument, one can show that individuals with a higher loss level have ceteris paribus a steeper indifference curve. Finally, consider a change in wealth
where A( X ) is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. It is assumed in the following that all individuals have decreasing absolute risk aversion, so individuals with lower wealth (and thus with larger risk aversion) have a steeper indifference curve as long as 1 2 X X , i.e., as long as there is under-insurance. For over-insurance, the result is reversed.
It is important to keep in mind that if I = L, the slope of the indifference curve is Q . (A risk-averse individual will buy full insurance if the premium is fair.)
The equilibrium concept used in this study is the one Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) employed: "Equilibrium in a competitive market is a set of contracts such that, when consumers choose contracts to maximize expected utility, (i) no contract in the equilibrium set makes negative expected profits; and (ii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set that, if offered, will make a non negative profit."
It is well known that the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition of equilibrium in insurance markets is equivalent to Nash's equilibrium of the following game: At stage one, risk-neutral firms offer one contract each. At stage two, customers choose between contracts. The expected profit of a firm from a contract (P, I) that is taken by someone who is with probability H a high risk is given by (
Note that here, firms are required to offer one contract at most, while in a more general model, one would like to have firms offering a menu of contracts instead. Some of the following results depend on this restriction. The author will return to this point in the final section. If the standard equilibrium concepts are used, namely the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium, the Wilson equilibrium (Wilson, 1977) , the WilsonMiyazaki-Spence (WMS) equilibrium (Wilson, 1977; Miyazaki, 1977; and Spence, 1978) , or the Riley equilibrium (Riley, 1979) , the author's results hold in all cases except the WMS concept, in which cross-subsidization becomes possible.
Differing Risks and Differing Wealth Levels: The Standard Case
The author now discusses diagrammatically the possible scenarios if there is asymmetric information about risks and wealth and where in the relevant region of the contract space the single crossing property holds. This technical requirement is explained below in more detail. 
Define as the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) pair of contracts these contracts that constitute the RS equilibrium if only the hh type and the lh type are present. Call these contracts A and B. They are shown in Figure 1 . On the two axes are the premium and indemnity. The straight lines are the zero-profit lines for the high-and the low-risk types. Consider the situation where the slope of the indifference curve of the ll type at B is lower than that of the hh type. Following Equation (2), this implies that
If this condition holds, it will be called the standard case. In the next section, the author shows that if the wealth levels are not too far apart, this condition is satisfied. Proof: The derivation of the equilibrium is a straightforward extension of the discussion in Rothschild and Stiglitz. This is displayed in Figure 1 . High risks obtain their fair full insurance contract, while low risks obtain the best fair contract available such that no high risk has an incentive to buy this contract. As the indifference curve of the hh type is less steep than that of the hl type, it is the former that determines the position of the low-risk contract. Q.E.D.
In this equilibrium, only the hh type is indifferent between two contracts. This is for two reasons. First, as is usual in these models, it is the high-risk type that considers buying the cheaper contracts that are offered to the low risks. Second, the hh type is less risk averse than the hl type. Therefore, the hh type is less distracted by a partial insurance contract that is offered to the low-risk types than the hl type.
In the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) model, the equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist if the number of high risks is sufficiently low, so that the indifference curve of the low-risk type cuts the zero-profit line for a pooling contract. For two types, this line is defined by
, where h M is the proportion of the high-risk type in society, given that there is only one wealth level. Accordingly, 1
is the proportion of the low-risk type. Allowing for additional heterogeneity introduces two further effects, which have different consequences for the existence of the equilibrium. First, the introduction of a different type with larger wealth shifts the contract for the low risks to lower indemnity levels. In those cases, the low risks might find a pooling full insurance contract more attractive, which makes the RS equilibrium less likely to exist. However, if there are sufficiently many high risks with larger wealth, then this pooling full insurance contract has a large premium, which makes it less attractive for the low risks. This then makes the RS equilibrium more likely to exist. 3 One can show that if Equation (4) 
FIGURE 2 Observable and Unobservable Wealth
Proof: (a) Consider a situation in which for both rich and poor types equilibrium exists, if the contracts can condition on wealth. Then the high risks would both obtain contract A, as drawn in Figure 2 , while the hl (ll) type obtains contract É B Bb . If wealth is unobservable, the candidate equilibrium contracts are the same contracts for all types apart from the ll type. Her contract shifts to the left (from Bb to B), as otherwise the hh type would choose the contract. The indifference curve of the ll type might then cut the zero-profit line of the ll and hh types 4 (the dashed line in the diagram). If this occurs to the left of the indifference curve of the hl type, which goes through Ae.g., at point C-then an equilibrium does not exist. This will occur if the number of hh types is very small compared to the number of ll types, which shifts the pooling line of the hh and the ll types downwards, or if the wealth of the hh type is large, which shifts contract B to the left and, therefore, the indifference curve of the ll type upwards.
(b) Consider now a situation in which hl
M is sufficiently low compared to ll M , such that an equilibrium for the hl and ll types does not exist, if wealth is observable. If wealth is unobservable, and if there are sufficiently many of the hh type, the zeroprofit line of the pooling contract will shift upwards. If this effect is strong enough, equilibrium will exist in the unobservable case. Q.E.D.
4 A zero-profit line for types ij and mn is given by
5 For different parameter values, a profit-making pooling contract for the ll, hh, and hl types might be feasible. Also, in that case equilibrium does not exist.
Relaxing the Single Crossing Property
So far the author assumed that at contract B the slope of the indifference curve of type hh is steeper than the slope of the ll type. This is not necessarily the case. As B is a point of under-insurance, it is a priori not clear who will pay more for one more unit of coverage, the person with a high risk but low risk aversion or the one with a low risk but high risk aversion. If the ll type is very risk averse, i.e., very poor, he or she might even prefer contract A (full insurance with a high premium) to contract B (under-insurance with a low premium). Formally, the "single crossing property," i.e., indifference curves cross only once, which is usually assumed in adverse selection models, does not hold in this case.
In the following, the author derives one necessary and one sufficient condition for that to be the case. Following Equation (4), the violation of the single crossing property at contract B implies that
where * * l P I Q and I* is given by
If along the (5) is smaller than the right side, it is easy to verify that it will stay smaller for all larger values of I. So, a necessary condition for Inequality (5) to be true is that it holds at I = P = 0. This implies:
By using the result from Equation (3), a sufficient condition can be derived:
As I* is independent of , * l I L X , and given the assumption on the slope of U, one can always find a sufficiently small l X such that the inequality in Equation (8) is satisfied. This just implies that if the low-risk type is risk averse enough, the result holds.
However, if the difference in wealth (risk) is small (large), or if the size of the loss is small, Inequality (7) shows that the slope of the indifference curve of the ll type will not be steeper than the slope of the hh type. However, it is not correct to conclude that 6 This holds because
for a sufficiently small difference in risks or for sufficiently large losses Inequality (8) will be satisfied, as I* depends on , h l Q Q , and L.
Another parameter influences the differences in slopes, namely the change in the degree of absolute risk aversion induced by different wealth levels. To see this, take
for example a utility function with constant relative risk aversion S . Then Inequality (7) transforms into
So if S is large the inequality is satisfied. The inequality in Equation (8) holds only for large
Having established that the violation of the single crossing property may hold for large differences in wealth, the author now turns to the analysis of this case.
Proposition 3: If the single crossing property does not hold, conditions for equilibrium existence depend on the relative proportion of agents. When equilibrium exists, only one equilibrium fully separates low and high risks. In this particular equilibrium, firms make positive profit.
Proof: Such an equilibrium is shown in Figure 3 .
For I = L, the slope of the indifference curve for the ll type is l Q , which is smaller than the slope of the hh type at I = L. Thus it follows that there must be one point between A and B at which the indifference curves of the ll and the hh types are tangential to each other (point C). 7 Now consider the case in which contracts A, B, and C are offered and where the lh type chooses contract B; the hh and hl types, contract A; and the ll type, contract C. 
, any deviating contract, designed to attract the ll type, will also attract the hh type and make a loss. 8 Therefore, these contracts can be sustained as an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
In this equilibrium, all firms offering contract C make positive expected profit.
9 Deviating from this point is not profitable, as it is not possible to offer another contract that will be taken up only by the ll type. Even in a perfectly competitive environment with free entry, no other firm will opt to under-bid this contract, as not only the desired low-risk individuals will choose this new contract, but also the undesired highrisk individuals, which will lead to negative expected profits.
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For the following proposition, the author defines partial risk pooling: If a contract is chosen in equilibrium by more than one risk type, where one type mixes between contracts, we call this situation partial risk pooling.
Proposition 4: If the single crossing property does not hold, partial risk pooling might occur.
Proof: As firms make profits with contract C, and high-risk, high-wealth types are indifferent between contracts A and C, some but not all of the hh individuals might choose contract C as well in equilibrium. This holds only if some of the high risks still choose contract A, because otherwise C would, for not making a loss, have to lie above the pooling line of the hh and ll types. But, following the proof of Proposition 3, this would violate the equilibrium-existence condition. Q.E.D.
One should remark that although this partial pooling is a possible equilibrium of the game, it will be Pareto-dominated by the complete separating scenario, as discussed in Proposition 3.
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In contrast to partial risk pooling, complete risk pooling is defined by the author as a situation in which more than one risk type buys a particular contract and only that contract.
Proposition 5: Complete risk pooling occurs only for very special parameter values.
Proof: This is shown in Figure 4 and proved below.
The author will show that risk pooling can occur only at a point at which the indifference curves are tangential; insurers make zero profit; and the indifference curve of the hl type, which goes through A, intersects. This combination occurs only under very restrictive assumption on the parameters. The author proceeds in four steps:
1. As was argued by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , pooling contracts cannot exist if indifference curves of different risk types cut each other at this point. In that case, one can always find a new contract close to the old one, which will be taken up only by the low-risk types. This is shown in Figure 4(a) , where the pooling contract (b) is dominated by the contract a. So one needs the indifference curves of the hh and the ll types to be tangential at a possible point of pooling.
2. A contract in which the indifference curves are tangential but that makes a profit also cannot exist in equilibrium, as one could easily under-bid such a contract. This is displayed in Figure 4(b) , where the pooling contract (b) lies above the (dashed) zero-profit line for the two types. The zero-profit line has the equation
Nonexistence of Complete Risk Pooling Contracts
M M Q Q X X ) that this point coincides with the intersection of the indifference curve of the hl type. Q.E.D.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The author has extended the work by Rothschild and Stiglitz to allow for different wealth in addition to different risks of the insured. If the difference in wealth is small, different wealth types are pooled while different risks are separated. If the difference in wealth is large, equilibria may exist at which firms make positive profits with separating contracts. Separating different wealth types with the same risk may occur The introduction of a further unobservable parameter did not allow the author to solve the equilibrium nonexistence problem. The study has shown that in some cases, the problem may be strengthened and in others, it may be weakened. It is left to the reader to verify that similar results can be obtained if the individuals differ in the size of their losses instead of wealth in addition to the different risks.
In this model, the author considered firms that offer one contract each. If one allows for the possibility of a menu of contracts and thus for cross-subsidization, propositions 1, 2, and 5 remain to hold, but 3 and 4 do not. To see this, note that if firms make a profit with the poor, low-risk type and zero profit with the high risks, then another firm might offer two contracts that are slightly better for both types, but still such that the high risks do not prefer to buy the contract designed for the low risks. Then the contract for the high risks will make a loss, but this loss is much smaller than the profit that will be made with the low-risk type. So altogether such a deviation is profitable.
However, recently Inderst and Wambach (2001) have argued that if insurers face capacity constraints, then the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts are equilibrium outcomes even if a Pareto-improving pair of cross-subsidizing contracts exists. Intuitively, if a firm can serve only a limited number of customers, then by offering two new contracts, it cannot be sure that the low risks will turn up. Indeed, as there will be rationing at the firm, one can show that only high risks will queue, as they gain more from choosing the new contracts. This in turn makes any deviating offer unattractive. Applying this logic to the present model implies that also propositions 3 and 4 remain to hold, even if firms offer more than one contract.
One limitation of the model is the restriction to four types only. However, from figures 1 and 3, one can get an idea of a possible solution with many different degrees of risk aversion. The set of contracts will lie along the indifference curve of the high-risk type with the highest wealth, which goes through the point of fair full insurance for this type. Individuals with high risks will choose the full insurance contract. Lowrisk types with different wealth can choose any contract along this contract line. If their contract lies above their zero-profit line (i.e., P = l L Q ), their indifference curve must be tangential at this point. This argument will break down if the proportion of types is such that deviations from these points are profitable. An extension to a finite number of types with respect to risks is also possible. As was argued by Rothschild and Stiglitz, in a continuum of risk types, equilibrium does not exist.
It might be argued that in equilibrium, the ll type has an incentive to demonstrate his wealth, as the insurer could in that case offer him a contract better than B. However, it is not clear that one can credibly reveal that one has low wealth, and in any case, the author has used wealth to demonstrate the effects of different risk aversion. That risk aversion by itself is not verifiable is surely not contentious.
In this study, the author has limited the insurer to offering only deterministic price quantity contracts. It can easily be seen that random contracts will not change the results, because if an accident has happened, it is the ll type who is more risk averse than the hh type. 13 However, in some cases, the insurer might have more instruments available to deal with multidimensional asymmetric information. For example, life insurance contracts are often sold together with saving contracts that might be used to screen between rich and poor customers. This will be an interesting topic for future research.
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